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ABSTRACT
The inﬂuence of the EU (and the IMF) on domestic cutback management were
studied in nine European countries. In this concluding article, a cross-country com-
parative analysis is presented. The inﬂuence of the EU and the IMF being most
evident in bailed-out countries, we ﬁrst take a closer look at the loan programmes in
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, plus the hardly-known earlier bailouts in
Hungary and Latvia. We then turn to two factors that inﬂuence cutbacks and reforms:
economics and politics. Finally, the concept of the inﬂuence of the EU (and the IMF)
is diﬀerentiated into degrees and types of inﬂuence.
KEYWORDS EU governance; EU and IMF inﬂuence; ﬁscal consolidation; cutback management; bailouts; nine-
country comparative analysis; political circumstances
Introduction
In the preceding articles of this special issue, the inﬂuence of the European Union
(EU) (and the International Monetary Fund: IMF) on cutback management in nine
countries in Southern, Western, and Eastern Europe – Greece, Ireland, and Portugal;
Spain and Italy; Hungary and Latvia; and the Netherlands and Estonia – have been
analysed by academic experts in the respective countries. In this concluding article,
a comparative cross-country analysis is presented.
The issue of EU inﬂuence on domestic state aﬀairs is nowadays highly contested,
ﬁercely debated, and strongly politicized. A wave of scepticism about the EU has
swept over large swathes of Europe. Former Communist East European countries like
Poland and Hungary, which adopted a pro-Western and pro-Europe stance imme-
diately after their independence from Soviet Russia, are reverting to a populist,
nationalist, and patriotic standpoint against what they perceive as EU interference.
Britain has voted in a referendum to leave the EU. In many Western European
countries, nationalist populist anti-EU parties are gaining popular support. Southern
European countries like Greece, Portugal, and Spain also protest against EU inter-
ference, as their bailouts resulted in harsh austerity measures, high unemployment,
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and reduced living standards. In this special issue, we have investigated one particular
facet of EU inﬂuence, albeit a very signiﬁcant and relevant one: domestic cutbacks
and reforms at the time of the crisis. How did Brussels inﬂuence cutback manage-
ment by governments in the countries aﬀected? The bailouts in Greece, Portugal,
Spain, and Hungary led to massive public protest, violent demonstrations, and
widespread social unrest, characterized by indignation, condemnation, deﬁance,
and resistance. In our study, we have sought to avoid the normative, ideological,
and political prejudices about country cases by presenting an empirical analysis based
on facts and ﬁgures, especially an international comparative analysis. As stated in the
introduction to this special issue, we hope that this empirical academic analysis of EU
inﬂuence can somehow nuance the current populist prejudices about Brussels’ per-
ceived meddling and interfering.
The central research question in our study was: What was the inﬂuence of the EU
(and the IMF where applicable) on domestic cutback management?
Although the ﬁnancial-economic aspects of ﬁscal consolidation are paramount, in
this special issue we were primarily interested in the politics of cutback management –
the domestic governments’ political decision-making about cutbacks and reform:
How did the EU (and the IMF) inﬂuence cutback management, both in countries
that were bailed out and in those that were not?
EU and IMF inﬂuence on domestic cutbacks is most obvious in countries that
received loans because of sovereign debt defaults. The loans were provided on strict
ﬁscal, ﬁnancial, and structural reform conditions imposed by the EU and the IMF. In
this concluding article, we ﬁrst take a closer look at these ﬁnancial assistances (loan)
programmes, the so-called bailouts. How big were the loans, what were the loan
objectives, and what were the loan conditions, relating to both ﬁscal and structural
reform? And what were the outcomes? What were the similarities and diﬀerences,
and how can these be explained? First, the fully-ﬂedged 2010–2011 bailouts in
Greece, Ireland, and Portugal are considered, plus the more restricted 2012 banking
sector bailout in Spain. The earlier 2008 bailouts in Hungary and Latvia, which were
not widely publicized in the Western media, are then addressed.
The factors that inﬂuence and possibly explain the cutbacks and reforms are
subsequently examined. Besides the inﬂuence of the EU (and the IMF) – our main
focus of interest – we identify two factors: economics and politics.
The economic, ﬁnancial (banking), and ﬁscal situation in a country were the prime
determinant of its economic and ﬁscal crisis in general, and sovereign debt crisis in
particular. Excessively large state debt was a main cause for sovereign debt payback
default, as illustrated in the Greek case. An excessive budget deﬁcit was another main
cause of the ﬁscal crisis, and an important factor in determining the extent of
consolidation necessary. An ailing ﬁnancial banking sector, holding private (house-
hold and corporate) debt, was the underlying cause of a number of debt defaults. The
economic, ﬁnancial, and ﬁscal circumstances in the run-up to the crisis are summar-
ized and analysed across countries.
Economics alone is not suﬃcient to explain the crisis. Credit rating agencies, whose
downgrading triggered countries’ debt defaults, explicitly take politics and government
into account to estimate a state’s ability to repay debt and make timely interest
payments. So, we also take a closer look at the political situation in the countries
studied. We look at the party-politics during the run-up to the crisis, the negotiations
with the EU and the IMF about loan programmes, and the implementation of the loan
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conditions, that is, the austerity measures and structural reforms. The anti-austerity
protests, the massive and often violent demonstrations, strikes, and social unrest are
only brieﬂy touched upon in this article, although the harsh, painful, and detested
austerity eﬀects of the bailouts to a large extent determine the ultimate ‘societal success’
of the ﬁnancial assistance programmes. Success is not only about deﬁcit reduction and
economic growth, but also about unemployment, poverty, and social inequality.
Finally, we focus on the main point of interest in this special issue: What was the
inﬂuence of the EU (and the IMF)? Degrees and types of inﬂuence are diﬀerentiated
according to the degree of an economic, ﬁnancial, and ﬁscal crisis in a country, and
according to the governance instruments at the EU’s disposal (Ongaro 2014). We
further diﬀerentiate the degrees of inﬂuence according to the particular political
circumstances in the various countries.
The analytical framework used here is summarized in Figure 1.
The ﬁnancial assistance programme
The worldwide banking crisis was triggered by the fall of Lehman Brothers in
September 2008. Although some initiatives were taken in Europe towards interna-
tional coordination (G-20 meeting and Euro summit in October 2008), each country
addressed its own banking problems. The ensuing economic crisis that surfaced in
Europe in 2009 was again managed by each country on its own; and the subsequent
ﬁscal crisis that most European governments began facing in 2010 was tackled by
each government on its own. The EU had little inﬂuence on the ﬁscal cutbacks and
reforms at the time, except through its Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure (EDP).
Bailouts in 2010–2012
The Greek sovereign debt crisis in 2010 could not be solved domestically. Greece had
become a debt defaulter and made an appeal to the IMF for ﬁnancial assistance
(Featherstone 2011; IMF 2013b). Greece being a Eurozone member, the EU and the
European Central Bank (ECB) were also involved (contagion from the Greek default
to the entire Eurozone was a major reason for granting the loan), leading to the novel
Economic
Financial (banks)
Fiscal
Consolidations
Elections
Governments
Politics
Financial markets
Credit rating 
agencies
Influence of EU
(and IMF)
Explanatory
circumstances
Influence of EU 
(and IMF)
Bailouts
Consolidations 
and bailouts
Figure 1. Analytical framework.
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construction of the Troika: the European Commission (EC), the European Central
Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. The EU, particularly its informal leader,
Germany’s Chancellor Merkel, had insisted on the IMF being involved because the
Fund had ample experience and standard operating procedures for these crisis
situations, whereas the EU did not. Following the usual IMF procedures, the
Troika worked out a programme that deﬁned the loan amount, the objectives, and
the so-called conditionalities (Featherstone 2011; IMF 2012; Spanou 2017). The loan
conditions consisted primarily of the ﬁscal and ﬁnancial policies to remediate the
deﬁcit and banks, and of so-called structural reforms (see below).
At the end of 2010, Ireland became a debt defaulter and asked the IMF, the EU,
and the ECB for help. Ireland had misinterpreted the 2008 banking crisis and given
overly generous bank guarantees that proved to be so costly that the state itself had to
ask for ﬁnancial help. The bank crisis thus became a sovereign debt crisis (Hardiman
and MacCarthaigh 2016).
Early in 2011, Portugal had to ask for ﬁnancial assistance, more or less for the same
reasons as Greece: the bad economic and ﬁscal circumstances caused the bond interest
rates on the large and foreign-owned debt to rise to unsustainable levels. Portugal’s
ability to reﬁnance its debt on the ﬁnancial markets had come to a halt (Araujo 2017).
A major concern during the sovereign debt crisis (also called the Eurozone crisis)
was that the defaults in the smaller Southern Euro-member states would be followed
by defaults in the large member states Spain and Italy. A fully ﬂedged bailout package
for these large countries would be extremely costly, maybe even impossible. In 2012,
Spain asked the EU and the ECB for a bailout of its banking sector. Initially,
€100 billion was held in reserved for the recapitalization, restructuring, and resolu-
tion of the banks and in the end € 41.3 billion was expended, less than 4% of Spanish
GDP, about a tenth of the relative size of the other three bailouts (Kickert and Ysa
2014). It was hoped that the moderate-sized help would be suﬃcient. The Spanish
bailout concerned only the banking sector; nevertheless, the EU enforced the con-
ditionality that Spain should fulﬁl the European Semester requirements (ﬁscal and
structural reforms) (Badell and Ysa 2017).
Loan size, objectives, and conditions
Table 1 summarizes the key elements of the loan programmes (bailouts) in the
Eurozone in 2010–2012. The key elements are now compared to reveal the simila-
rities and diﬀerences.
The (relative) size of the loan programmes (as a percentage of GDP) was rather
similar, initially. That changed when Greece did not succeed in exiting the loan
programme and needed a second loan in 2012 (and a third in 2016, not covered in
the table). The Greek debt has by now become so unsustainably high that the IMF is
proposing debt restructuring (writing-oﬀ loans) (IMF-IEO 2016), but the EU (with
Germany and the Netherlands to the forefront) is currently strongly opposing this.
It is clear that the programme objectives were similar: restoring conﬁdence in the banks
and the sovereign state. Restoration of economic growth did not need to be targeted in the
Irish case, as its economy was sound (contrary to that of Greece and Portugal).
Ownership of loan programme
The table summarizes the support and cooperation of national authorities during
implementation, oﬃcially called ‘ownership’. The Greek authorities only half-heartedly
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supported the loan programme (lack of ownership). This is understandable, as the harsh
cutbacks and deep economic recession led to high unemployment, poverty, and social
inequality. Public protest and social unrest were massive and violent (Spanou 2017). In
2010, there had been no consultation with the opposition. In 2011, the technocratic
Papademos government did have cross-party support, but even so the opposition was
strong. There is still no end in sight for the Greek crisis and bailout.
Although the Portuguese sovereign debt crisis resembled that of Greece in many
respects (weak economy, large deﬁcit and debt, and polarized politics), the bailout was
successfully exited in time (EC 2016b). The Troika undertook the loan negotiations with
a caretaker government and consulted the opposition and social partners, resulting in
wide and cross-party support. Portuguese authorities created a special coordination unit
directly under the prime minister (high ownership) (Hardiman et al. 2019).
The Irish bailout did not cause party antagonism. Although there were disagree-
ments over its implementation, there was cross-party commitment to rapidly solve
the default crisis. A special inner cabinet committee was created directly under the
prime minister to pro-actively cooperate with the Troika (high ownership). The
Department of Finance was split to create a new department, responsible for expen-
diture control and managerial reform (Hardiman and MacCarthaigh 2016;
MacCarthaigh 2017; MacCarthaigh and Hardiman Forthcoming). Ireland successfully
exited its bailout before the planned end date (EC 2015).
Bailouts in 2008
Whereas most West Europeans were informed by the media about the Greek bailout,
and now and then about the Portuguese and Irish bailouts, hardly anyone has ever
heard about the IMF–EU bailouts of two years earlier, right at the outbreak of the
worldwide ﬁnancial crisis (Table 2). In October 2008, EU member (not Euro mem-
ber) Hungary applied for help from the IMF, which together with the EU and the
Table 2. Bailouts in Central Eastern Europe in 2008.
Hungary Latvia
Approval date October 2008 December 2008
Expiry date 2010 ended before completion 2011
Amount from IMF
(percentage of total)
€12.5 billion
(64.1%)
€1.7 billion
(22.6%)
Amount from elsewhere €6.0 billion: EU
€1 billion: World Bank
€3.1 billion: EU
€0.4 billion: World Bank
€1.9 billion: Nordic countries
€0.4 billion: EBRD and others
Total amount
(percentage of GDP)
€19.5 billion
(18.2%)
€7.5 billion
(30.8%)
Programme objectives Substantial ﬁscal consolidation to restore
conﬁdence in government debt
sustainability
Liquidity support and bank capitalization to
restore conﬁdence in banking sector
Reduce the risk of regional contagion
Stop liquidity crisis while
maintaining ﬁxed exchange
rate
Resolution of systemic Parex
Bank
Restore conﬁdence in banking
sector
Reduce ﬁscal deﬁcit to
Maastricht criterion
Restore competitiveness under
ﬁxed exchange rate
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World Bank devised a loan programme (the ﬁrst-ever case of joint IMF–EU support)
(IMF 2011; Torok Forthcoming). In December 2008, EU member Latvia asked the
IMF for help (followed by Romania and Ukraine, not covered here) (IMF 2013a). In
both countries, foreign exchange debt problems (bank loans in foreign currency for
household mortgages, plus foreign-owned private and public debt) formed the core of
the debt-default crisis (Cepilovs and Török 2019).
Loan size, objectives, and conditions
Table 2 shows that the (relative) size of both early loan programmes (as a percentage
of GDP) was lower than the later 2010–2011 loans. The IMF’s contribution to the
Hungary loan was much larger than that of the EU (ﬁrst time ever confronted with
a bailout). In the Latvia bailout that quickly followed, the IMF involvement was less,
and in the later 2010–2011 bailouts the IMF provided about 25 to 30% of the total
loan, with total loans amounting to about 40 to 45% of GDP.
The programme objectives of both early loan programmes were diﬀerent from
those of the later 2010–2011 programmes. Bank liquidity and foreign currency
exchange were the main problems to be solved. The diﬀerence between both coun-
tries was that all the large banks in Hungary were foreign-owned (with parent banks
providing liquidity), whereas Latvia had a large insolvent domestic bank (Parex) to be
rescued. Moreover, Hungary devaluated the Forint, whereas Latvia insisted on main-
taining the ﬁxed currency peg (Cepilovs and Török 2019).
Ownership of the loan programme
Regarding ownership of the loan programmes, that is, the domestic authorities’ support
and cooperation, the Latvia bailout was initially confronted with political problems
(prime minister resigned, upcoming elections), and early in 2009 street protests broke
out. However, the loan programme was successfully exited (Cepilovs 2017). There was
much less public protest and social unrest in Latvia than in Hungary. Ownership of the
Hungary bailout was controversial. It was requested by a minority government, the
remnants of a coalition break-up. In April 2009, the prime minister resigned and
a technocratic government was formed. Then, the April 2010 elections were won (with
a two-thirds majority) by the nationalist-populist opposition party, which, like the
population at large, ﬁercely opposed the loan programme. The IMF loan programme
was soon ended, as a result of disagreement about the new government’s ﬁscal
measures; and a number of unique (and disputed) one-oﬀ cutback measures resulted
in Hungary leaving the EU’s EDP. The nationalist populist Prime Minister, Viktor
Orbán, resented foreign interference. The inﬂuence of Washington (IMF) and Brussels
(EU) was to be restrained (Torok Forthcoming).
Outcomes of bailouts: success or failure
Were the loan programmes successful in solving the countries’ crises? This metho-
dologically diﬃcult question is hard to answer. Success and failure are aﬀected by
many factors other than the loan programme alone, especially the international
ﬁnancial and economic markets. Moreover, as stated in the introduction, success
and failure is not only about bank solvency, deﬁcit reduction, and economic recovery,
but also about social and political factors like unemployment, poverty, social inequal-
ity, and the resulting public protest and social unrest. Table 3 summarizes the
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outcomes of the loan programmes as detailed in the oﬃcial evaluation documents of
the IMF and the EC (references below Table 3), and therefore mainly framed in
economic terms.
Two loan programmes stand out as clear failures. First, the Greek case failed
because the loans did not succeed in remediating the Greek state ﬁnances and even
less so the economy (IMF 2013b). The massive cutbacks requested in the loan
programme further deepened the economic recession, resulting in high unemploy-
ment, poverty, and social inequality. Second, the Hungarian case failed, as the newly
elected nationalist-populist government terminated the IMF loan programme before
completion and also prematurely exited the EU’s EDP. Hungarian economic sustain-
ability is disputed (IMF 2011).
One loan programme stands out as a clear success. The Irish loan programme not
only succeeded in restoring conﬁdence in the banking sector and public ﬁnances, but
also resulted in Ireland’s economic recovery. Its underlying economy was highly
productive and competitive (EC 2015).
The Portuguese and Latvian loan programmes were successful in the sense that
conﬁdence in the banks and the state were restored, but the weaknesses of both
economies in terms of low productivity and weak competitiveness persevered, result-
ing in disappointing economic growth and unemployment in the years following the
bailouts. The structural reforms to cure the economic weaknesses were insuﬃcient
and unsuccessful (IMF 2013a; EC 2016b).
The banking bailout in Spain was successful in the recapitalization, restructuring, and
resolution of the banks. Whether the ﬁscal and economic outcomes were successful can
be disputed; in the short term not, in the longer term maybe (EC 2016a).
From the point of view of the unemployed and impoverished crisis victims, especially
the large number of unemployed youth in Southern Europe – revealingly called the ‘lost
generation’ – the ‘success and failure’ of the bailouts looked quite diﬀerent, as evidenced
by the considerable social unrest and protest movements (see below).
Economic background to the bailouts
The initial economic conditions of each sovereign debt defaulter were the same: large
state debt and deﬁcit, combined with negative economic prospects, led international
credit rating agencies (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch) to downgrade the
relevant countries, leading to unsustainable interest rates on foreign-owned state
bonds. The diﬀerences in economic and ﬁnancial circumstances between the coun-
tries are now considered.
Economic situation
In Greece and Portugal, joining the EU resulted in easy and cheap access to foreign
capital, further enhanced by joining the Eurozone. The inﬂux of foreign capital,
which initially fuelled substantial economic growth – the main incentive for joining
the EU and the Eurozone –, then began to have negative eﬀects. Growth supported by
the EU structural funds was driven mainly by domestic consumption and not
invested in productivity and competitiveness. The Greek and Portuguese economies
were in bad shape (EC 2016b; IMF 2013b).
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Ireland, on the other hand, had made use of the EU structural funds and foreign
capital to develop a highly productive and competitive economy. The economy was
strong and growing fast (EC 2015).
The Hungarian economy did not fare well after its transition to democracy and the
free market. The economy plummeted and unemployment soared. External ﬁnancial
assistance was needed. Hungary had four IMF loan programmes in the 1980s and six in
the 1990s. Hungary’s hitherto loose ﬁscal discipline was only tightened after Hungary’s
accession to the EU in 2004, when the EDP was instantly enacted (IMF 2011).
Since early 2000, Latvia had enjoyed an economic boom, further boosted by
joining the EU in 2004. Growth was, however, driven mainly by domestic consump-
tion, resulting in high inﬂation, a housing bubble, and a large deﬁcit (IMF 2013a).
Financial (banking) sector situation
In Greece, the ﬁnancial (banking) sector was not initially considered problematic. In
Portugal, the banking sector had collapsed and was rescued at a high cost. Of the
€78 billion Portuguese loan programme, €12 billion was destined for the banking
bailout (EC 2016b).
The crisis in Ireland resulted mainly from the overly generous and costly banking
sector support provided by the Irish government in 2008. The relatively large Irish
banking sector was strongly exposed to real estate, and the outbreak of the worldwide
banking crisis led to the bursting of the housing bubble. The bank rescue measures
resulted in a steep rise in state debt, thereby turning the banking crisis into
a sovereign debt crisis.
In Spain too, the main problem was banks’ high exposure to real estate and
a housing bubble that burst when the ﬁnancial crisis broke out in 2008. Banks
collapsed and had to be rescued. A boom–bubble–bust cycle materialized, like in
Ireland (EC 2016a).
At the time of the 2008–2010 banking and Eurozone crisis, the Italian banking
sector was considered sound. The relatively conservative risk-averse Italian banks had
not ventured into the complex and risky ﬁnancial constructs causing the fall of
Anglo-American banks. Only more recently, in 2016–2017, were Italian banks con-
fronted with mounting toxic assets.
In Hungary and Latvia, the ﬁnancial sector circumstances leading to the defaults
were diﬀerent (Cepilovs and Török 2019). There, the main cause of the debt defaults
emanated from the ﬁnancial sector, particularly the foreign exchange market crisis. In
Hungary, state debt was largely foreign-owned, and residents held large foreign
currency loans (mortgages). The foreign exchange market collapsed with the 2008
worldwide banking crisis. In October 2008, Hungary requested a bailout from the
IMF to prevent a ﬁnancial meltdown and possible regional contagion. In Latvia too,
state debt was mainly foreign-owned. Bank loans were in foreign currency, mainly for
household mortgages. The 2008 banking crisis led to a bank run, a liquidity problem,
and a foreign exchange crisis.
The diﬀerence between Hungary and Latvia in the banking sector was that, in
Hungary, all (larger) banks were foreign-owned, with foreign parent banks solving
the liquidity crisis, whereas in Latvia many (larger) banks were foreign, but
the second largest bank (Parex) was domestic and had to be rescued by the state.
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Political background to the bailouts
Political eﬀects and causes of cutbacks
The political eﬀects of ﬁscal consolidation found in an earlier study of 14 European
countries (Kickert and Randma-Liiv 2015, 186) were conﬁrmed in our country cases.
First, incumbent governments that planned hard cutbacks nearly always tended to
lose the next general elections. Secondly, coalition governments that planned hard
cutbacks often broke up, resulting in minority coalitions. Thirdly, coalition govern-
ments that made hard cutbacks and broke up nearly always tended to call early
elections. The remarkable exception was Estonia, where, at the second cutback round,
the coalition broke up and a minority government took charge but did not call early
elections and won the regular elections (Savi and Randma-Liiv 2015).
Kickert and Randma-Liiv’s (2015, 172) ﬁndings about political causes of ﬁscal
consolidation were also conﬁrmed. The assumption that right-wing governments
tend to take harder and swifter cutback measures than left-wing governments are
false. The political orientation of governments (right-centre-left) hardly matters for
cutbacks. Neither does the margin of parliamentary majority (minority-normal-
grand) have much inﬂuence on cutbacks. The primary factor explaining the size of
cutbacks is, virtually by deﬁnition, the size of the budget deﬁcit and debt.
We now discuss a couple of political factors that clearly had an inﬂuence on
cutback management: ﬁrst, the politicization and polarization of decision-making
; second, the change in political landscape caused by the rise of protest parties.
Politicization and polarization
In Greece and Portugal, the decision to request ﬁnancial assistance from the IMF and
the EU was characterized by politicization and polarization – the usual features of
Southern European political systems (Kickert 2011; Sotiropoulos 2017).
In the Greek polarized political party landscape, it is customary for a newly elected
incoming government to engage in a political blame game, accusing the previous-
ousted government of manipulating the economic and ﬁscal statistics. In 2010, the
new socialist prime minister attempted to persuade his European colleagues of his
ﬁscal reliability by openly doing penance for the falsiﬁed national deﬁcit and debt
statistics. It is doubtful, however, whether that really helped him in the subsequent
negotiations about the bailout conditions (Featherstone 2011). The negotiations
about the ﬁnancial assistance programme were characterized by mutual mistrust.
Greek protests and opposition were to no avail (Spanou 2017).
In Portugal, the socialist prime minister responded to the banking crisis and
ensuing economic recession by public investments in economic recovery. A bailout
was out of the question. After the outbreak of the Greek sovereign debt crisis in 2010,
the government had to reverse its course and go for outright cutbacks. It negotiated
three subsequent austerity programmes (Stability and Growth Pacts) with the EU.
The fourth cutback package was rejected in parliament by the centre-right Social
Democrat party, leading to the resignation of the socialist prime minister. The neo-
liberal and technocratic centre-right Social Democrats, who actually favoured the
conditions of the fourth austerity package, forced the outgoing prime minister to ask
for a bailout, resulting in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) containing more
or less the very same conditions (Araujo 2017). Opposition, protest, and obstruction
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against the Troika proposals were much less extensive in Portugal than in Greece.
The new Social-Democrat-led Portuguese government cooperated fully in the imple-
mentation of the bailout conditions (cutbacks and structural reforms); and it success-
fully exited the bailout programme on time (EC 2016b).
Like in neighbouring Portugal, the Spanish socialist prime minister responded
to the banking crisis and economic turndown by investing public funds in
economic recovery. The word ‘crisis’ was a political taboo. Austerity measures
were out of the question. In 2011, the EU intervened and told the prime minister
that Spain could not count on continuing to receive ﬁnancial support (ECB
buying up endangered Spanish bonds) unless it displayed ﬁscal discipline. In
May 2011, the socialist prime minister unexpectedly announced a cutback pack-
age, resulting in massive protests by backbenchers in his party, leading to his
resignation and the loss of the November 2011 elections to the centre-right
Popular Party. The new prime minister soon introduced larger cutback measures
(Badell and Ysa 2017; Kickert and Ysa 2014).
In Ireland too, the government for long denied the severity of the banking crisis
and refused to ask for ﬁnancial assistance, despite ECB pressure. It was the Central
Bank of Ireland that eventually precipitated the loan request. Moreover, oﬃcials had
been drawing up plans for a national recovery programme, and the MoU essentially
mirrored that plan (MacCarthaigh and Hardiman Forthcoming).
Hungarian national politics were also characterized by political polarization and
deep distrust between the Socialist Party (former Communists) on the one hand and
the opposing nationalist, conservative, and liberal parties on the other, dominated by
Viktor Orbán’s centre-right nationalist-populist party (Fidesz) (Lendvai 2012). After
the 2006 elections, the new Socialist-Liberal coalition grudgingly commenced to take
major cutback measures to meet the EU deﬁcit ceiling. The highly unpopular
measures were strongly opposed by the populist Fidesz party. Then, in 2008, the
government was forced to call for external ﬁnancial assistance, resulting in the
October 2008 bailout. The ensuing harsh cutback measures led to more protest and
unrest, resulting in the Fidesz party winning a sweeping two-thirds majority election
victory in 2010 (Torok Forthcoming).
Politicization and polarization did not take place in Latvia and Estonia, or in the
Netherlands.
In Latvia, from its independence in 1991, centre-right and nationalist parties
dominated in parliament (until 2016). After the January 2009 street protests against
the austerity plans, the government coalition broke up, and in March 2009 a cross-
party technocratic government, headed by a former Bank of Latvia chief economist
and former ﬁnance minister, was formed to negotiate the loan conditions with the
IMF and the EU (Cepilovs 2017).
In Estonia, the centre-right-left coalition government implemented its ﬁrst hard
cutback measures in June 2008. Then, cutback rounds in February and June 2008 led
the social democrats to leave the coalition, but the remaining centre-right minority
government did not call early elections and won the normal March 2011 elections
(Savi and Randma-Liiv 2015).
The Dutch political system is characterized by deep-rooted and long-time com-
promise and consensus (Kickert 2004). That did not change at the time of the ﬁscal
crisis. Moreover, the Dutch budget crisis was rather moderate and so were the
cutbacks (Kickert 2015).
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Change in political landscape: anti-austerity protest movements
Anti-austerity protest movements emerged in Europe in the aftermath of the global
ﬁnancial crisis. Governments were taking cutback measures to manage their ﬁscal
crisis, and austerity began to lead to rising unemployment and falling living stan-
dards, especially in countries that were bailed out (Fominaya and Hayes 2017).
In Greece, the crisis resulted in a collapse of the traditional two alternating-parties
system, with government power always in the hands of either the socialists (PASOK)
or the conservatives (New Democracy). In the 2015 elections, these two parties were
almost obliterated by the electorate for their apparent inability to handle the crisis.
The newly established left-wing (Marxist) party, Syriza, was the clear winner and
formed a government. Syriza was a protest party opposing the severe and painful
cutbacks enforced by the Troika each time another loan tranche was due. Moreover,
the political landscape was changed by the use of referenda against Troika-imposed
cutbacks. A ﬁrst attempt in 2011 to hold a referendum against the Troika austerity
measures was eﬀectively blocked by the EU. In 2016, the new Syriza government held
another referendum against the Troika cutbacks, which it won clearly. Nevertheless,
the Syriza government was forced back to the negotiation table in Brussels and for
further loans had to accept the very same conditions that had been voted down in the
referendum (Spanou 2017). Table 4 juxtaposes the situation of protest parties in
Hungary and in Greece.
The Spanish political landscape was likewise changed. Since the transition to
democracy, political power had always alternated between the socialists (PSOE) and
the conservatives (Popular Party: PP). Coalitions were alien in Spain. The brutal
economic recession – with huge (youth) unemployment and massive social unrest
(15M movement) – led to the creation of new protest parties on both the right (neo-
liberal pro-business Ciudadanos) and the left (Podemos). The 2015 and 2016 elec-
tions twice resulted in a hung parliament. After the ﬁrst elections, both PSOE and PP
refused to cooperate and mutually blocked possible multi-party coalitions, resulting
in yet another general election. Again, parliament was hung, and neither party was
willing to form, or capable of forming, a coalition. Eventually, and partly to avoid
a third round of elections in less than two years, the PSOE, after removing its leader,
ﬁnally decided to allow a minority government of the centre-right PP to be voted into
oﬃce by the parliament (Badell and Ysa 2017).
In Italy, the political landscape had radically changed in the 1990s after corruption
scandals. The traditional parties were wiped out by the electorate, and newly created
parties entered the stage, most notably the populist centre-right party combination
(Forza Italia) led by Berlusconi. By the end of the 1990s, political scientists tended to
conclude that Italy had entered a phase characterized by the layering of new and old
institutions without any veritable transition to a new republic (Bull and Rhodes 1997,
2013), a state of aﬀairs that has come to be characterized as a politico-administrative
Table 4. Success and failure of anti-austerity protest parties.
Hungary FIDESZ (Viktor Orbán) Greece SYRIZA (Tsipras)
Existing populist, nationalist, patriotic party
Against IMF–EU-imposed austerity and reforms
Won elections (two-thirds majority)
Quit IMF loan and ended EU’s Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure
Newly created left-wing (Marxist) party
Against Troika-imposed austerity and reforms
Won elections; won referendum
Nonetheless forced to accept loan conditions
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context in motion (Ongaro 2009). When the crisis hit Italy, resulting in a harsh recession,
enduring economic decline, rising unemployment, and social unrest, several protest
parties entered the political scene and managed to attract the electorate’s support
(notably the populist Five Star Movement, M5S). The ﬁscally unreliable Berlusconi
government was overthrown to make way for the independent technocratic Monti
government, supported by all main parties. That support lasted only until the following
elections, won by a small margin by the centre-left Democratic Party, which was able to
secure a majority only in the lower house (Di Mascio, Natalini, and Stolﬁ 2013; Badell et
al. 2019) and then eventually lost the subsequent elections in early 2018.
Conclusions and discussion
EU and IMF inﬂuence on domestic cutback management
Themain question addressed in this article was the inﬂuence of the EU (and the IMFwhere
relevant) on domestic cutback management. We ﬁrst diﬀerentiate degrees and types of
inﬂuencing according to the degree of an economic and ﬁscal crisis in a country, and
according to the EU’s ﬁscal governance instruments. Second, we further diﬀerentiate the
degrees of inﬂuencing according to the particular political circumstances in a country.
Degrees and types of inﬂuence
The degree and type of EU inﬂuence depends primarily on the severity of the economic
and ﬁscal crisis in a country. Diﬀerent degrees of economic and ﬁscal crisis call for
diﬀerent EU ﬁscal governance instruments. As long as a country has a balanced budget
and a debt brake, there is no EU intervention (apart from regular EU monitoring).
When the ﬁscal situation exceeds certain thresholds, the Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure
(EDP) comes into eﬀect. The 2011 EDP successors, European Semester, contains not
only ﬁscal corrective measures, but also recommendations for structural reforms. That
is, the EU not only intervenes in ﬁscal and economic aﬀairs, but also ‘recommends’
public sector reforms, such as in the labour market, pensions, and so forth.
When a country’s economic and ﬁscal situation deteriorates so much that the
international ﬁnancial markets start losing conﬁdence in that country’s creditworthi-
ness (credit rating agencies), and bond interest rates are rising to alarming heights,
the European Central Bank (ECB) can intervene by buying up the endangered bonds,
thus calming the markets. In return for such monetary support, the ECB and the EU
make ‘recommendations’ on ﬁscal aﬀairs and reforms.
When the economic and ﬁscal situation becomes so unsustainable that a country
loses its creditworthiness and defaults on its state debt (sovereign debt crisis), an
appeal can be made to the IMF and the EU to provide a temporary loan (bailout).
The loan programme is provided on conditions. The Troika intervenes in ﬁscal and
economic aﬀairs, and also requires a country to carry out structural reforms in, for
example, the labour market, pensions, and tax administration.
No direct inﬂuence in Estonia and the Netherlands
Estonia was hit hard by the ﬁscal and economic crisis. The Estonian government imple-
mented extensive and hard cutback measures at an early stage. Its strong desire to join the
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REVIEW 1361
Eurozone further enhanced its already strict ﬁscal discipline. Estonia managed to stay out
of the EU’s EDP, so there was no direct intervention by the EU. Indirectly, however, the EU
did exert inﬂuence because of the strict ﬁscal requirements for accession to the Eurozone,
which was top of Estonia’s political priorities (Kickert and Randma-Liiv 2019).
In the Netherlands, the ﬁscal and economic crisis was relatively mild. It did enter
the EU’s EDP, but was easily capable of overcoming the mild crisis with relatively
moderate measures. Interference from the EU was virtually non-existent. The Dutch
Ministry of Finance considered itself to be more capable than Brussels of handling
the crisis. Regarding budget discipline, it was rather the Dutch inﬂuencing Brussels
than the other way round. The Dutch, together with the Germans, had always been
pushing for stricter budgetary rules, ever since the Maastricht Treaty and even more
so since the crisis (Kickert and Randma-Liiv 2019).
More inﬂuence in Italy and Spain
In countries with more serious economic and ﬁscal problems and allegedly less ﬁscal
discipline, like Italy and Spain, the inﬂuence of the EU on the national government
was stronger (Badell et al. 2019).
Italy was not bailed out, but in summer 2011 the ﬁscal and economic situation
became dramatic, resulting in soaring bond interest rates. The ECB on a large scale
bought up endangered Italian state bonds. This monetary assistance came at a price
in terms of EU–ECB interference in Italy’s ﬁscal aﬀairs. Berlusconi was known to
have been furious about foreign interference in Italian sovereign (ﬁscal) aﬀairs (ECB–
Bank of Italy letter of recommendations).
In Spain, the ECB also bought up endangered state bonds, and apparently the
Spanish government also received an ECB letter of recommendations. The Spanish
prime minister was forced by the EU to reassure the international ﬁnancial markets
of his ﬁscal discipline by taking austerity measures. EU inﬂuence in Spain further
stepped up with the banking bailout. The Spanish banking sector bailout, with the
ECB and the EU monitoring and controlling a bank rescue and reform operation,
contained the conditions stipulated in the EU’s European Semester. Therefore, the
EU had more inﬂuence on the ﬁscal aﬀairs of Spain than on those of Italy.
Bailouts and the Troika
In countries that were so seriously aﬀected by the crisis that they had to be bailed out,
the inﬂuence of the EU (and the IMF) on the government were diﬀerent. There,
a Troika of IMF, EU, and ECB was established to monitor and control domestic ﬁscal
decision-making. The IMF had ample experience and standard operating procedures
for ﬁnancially assisting countries with balance-of-payment troubles. At the outbreak
of the Eurozone crisis in 2010, the EU had no experience in ﬁnancially assisting
troubled states (the IMF had taken the lead in Hungary’s and Latvia’s 2008 bailouts).
Reverse inﬂuence: domestic inﬂuences on IMF–EU loan programmes
The inﬂuence of the EU and the IMF on domestic cutback management was
obviously paramount in the loan programmes. Nevertheless, domestic actors mana-
ged to exert inﬂuence on the loan programme conditions, albeit in varying degrees.
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In Ireland, once the government was forced to recognize the real extent of the
banking crisis and therefore to request ﬁnancial assistance, the loan programme’s
MoU coincided to a large extent with the national recovery programme already
conceived by Irish ﬁnance ministry oﬃcials. So, Irish domestic inﬂuence on the
loan conditions was signiﬁcant.
In Portugal, the neo-liberal managerial social democratic opposition party forced
the socialist government to resign by voting down an austerity and reform package,
which it actually favoured, and which the Social Democrats managed to get inserted
in the loan programme’s MoU. Moreover, the loan programme was implemented by
a social democrat government. So, the inﬂuence of Portuguese domestic (opposition)
politics on the loan conditions was considerable.
The Greek case, however, seems an example of domestic authorities being coerced
into austerity and reforms, which they in vain contested, protested, and obstructed.
The anti-austerity Syriza party won the elections and won the anti-austerity refer-
endum, and yet, in the end, was forced to accept the EU–IMF loan conditions.
In Hungary, the newly elected government so much resented being coerced by the
EU and the IMF into cuts and reforms that they prematurely abandoned the loan
programme. Foreign inﬂuence on domestic aﬀairs was to be terminated.
Table 5 presents a schema of the degrees and types of EU (and IMF) inﬂuence.
Discussion: political economy not value free
The conditions that the Troika attached to its ﬁnancial assistance programmes were
contested in the ‘helped-out’ countries, most notably Greece and Hungary, with ﬁerce
public protests and widespread social unrest against the harsh consequences in terms
of lay-oﬀs, salary cuts, pension cuts, unemployment, and poverty. The dominant
economic frame of reference used in the EU, more speciﬁcally in the EC’s
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Aﬀairs (DG EcFin) (Buti and
Carnot 2013), which took the lead in Brussels, seems to be the mainstream economic
thinking in north-western European countries rather than that prevailing in southern
European countries. In other words, the countries paying the bill for the bailouts,
Germany and the Netherlands upfront, seemed to be imposing their economic views
on the loan-receiving countries, which resented the harsh loan conditions.
The predominant economic rationale in Brussels (and Washington) is that ﬁscal
consolidation based on spending cuts, rather than tax increases, is more likely to
reduce budget deﬁcits. Moreover, consolidation on the spending side rather than on
the tax side is less likely to create an economic recession (Alesina and Ardagna 2010).
Numerous empirical studies have been used to underpin these claims (Alesina 2010,
2012; Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi 2014). Spending-based consolidation could even
contribute to economic growth when accompanied by cutbacks in the costs of
administration, that is, cuts in size and pay (Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi 2014).
Economic policymakers employed these ﬁndings in the debate about how much
consolidation was needed, how fast, and with which instruments (Sutherland,
Hoeller, and Merola 2012; Molnar 2012; Blöchliger, Song, and Sutherland 2012).
A salient political aspect of ﬁscal consolidation is the question of whether harsh
ﬁscal austerity in times of economic recession is the right approach to adopt. The
fervent condemnations by Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman are well known. The
basic argument is that a weak economy will be further harmed by deﬁcit reductions,
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whereas economic growth is a good cure for deﬁcits, so it is preferable to stimulate
economic growth than to engage in cutbacks. Unfortunately, this debate is often
largely political-ideological, with debaters presuming to possess the moral prerogative
to condemn or justify ﬁscal consolidation. In the economics discussion platform
VoxEU, the danger of ﬁscal austerity leading to another economic recession was
discussed at the time by European economists (Corsetti 2012; De Grauwe 2013; Gros
2011) and top oﬃcials of the IMF (Cottarelli 2012) and the EU (Buti and Carnot
2013; Buti 2014).
The political economy ‘ﬁndings’ about the ﬁscal eﬀects of spending cuts rather
than tax increases, and the alleged beneﬁcial ﬁscal eﬀects of public sector cuts, may
seem to be amply empirically grounded, but political economy is not value free. The
seemingly neutral purely empirical ﬁndings are actually normative. The debate about
ﬁscal austerity and economic recession is heavily burdened with political ideology.
Nevertheless, it is an undeniable fact that mighty international institutions like the
EU, the IMF, the World Bank, and the OECD (and the credit rating agencies) have
been and possibly continue to be outspoken advocates of these ‘mainstream’ political
economic ‘insights’.
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